As Washington quietly debates letting Turkey back into the F‑35 stealth jet program, a NATO ally that bought advanced Russian weapons is testing just how far America will bend its own security rules.
Story Snapshot
- Turkey was kicked out of the F‑35 program in 2019 for buying a Russian S‑400 air defense system.
- The White House said the F‑35 “cannot coexist” with a Russian intelligence collection platform like the S‑400.
- Congress passed laws that block any F‑35 transfers until Turkey gives up the S‑400 and proves it will not buy similar Russian systems.
- Turkey still holds F‑35 production tools, and has lobbied hard for readmission, claiming the expulsion was unfair.
How a NATO Ally Got Thrown Out of America’s Stealth Jet Club
Turkey spent years as a core partner in the F‑35 project, helping build about 900 parts for the jet and planning to buy a large fleet of its own. In 2019, that partnership collapsed after Ankara accepted delivery of the Russian S‑400 air defense system. The White House said this choice “renders its continued involvement with the F‑35 impossible” and that the F‑35 “cannot coexist” with a Russian intelligence platform built to study its secrets. U.S. defense officials feared Russian technicians could use the S‑400 radar to map how the stealth jet appears on sensors and learn how to defeat it.
After the S‑400 arrived, the Pentagon moved fast to unwind Turkey’s role. All Turkish F‑35 personnel were told to leave the United States by the end of July 2019, and the government began cutting Turkish firms out of the jet’s supply chain. That retooling is expensive: U.S. planners estimated hundreds of millions of dollars in new engineering work, while Turkey lost an expected $9–11 billion in long‑term F‑35 parts business. The six F‑35s already built for Turkey were never delivered and remain in storage at a U.S. base. For many Americans, this episode looked like another example of a system that punishes taxpayers while political and corporate elites shrug and move on.
The Legal Wall: Why Congress Says “No S‑400, No F‑35”
Congress did more than complain; it locked Turkey’s expulsion into law. Long before the S‑400 arrived, the Senate passed a bill in 2018 to block F‑35 transfers over fears the Russian system would expose the jet’s secrets. After delivery, lawmakers used the 2017 Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act to sanction Ankara for a major deal with Russia’s defense industry, then added specific language in later defense laws that bars F‑35 transfers until Turkey “no longer possesses” the S‑400 and gives credible promises never to buy similar Russian systems again. These rules reflect a broad fear that elite decision‑makers will trade away vital technology for short‑term political deals, leaving ordinary citizens less safe.
Trump, in Ankara: "We don't want to sanction friends." He says he will remove the CAATSA sanctions on Turkey.
CAATSA, the sanctions regime imposed in 2020 alongside Turkey's F-35 expulsion, is the actual legal mechanism blocking both the F-35 readmission and the broader defense…
— The Tectonic (@thetect0nic) July 7, 2026
Security experts across the political spectrum argue this is not just about one country, but about protecting the entire F‑35 network that now spans the United States and 19 allied nations. If a NATO ally can buy high‑end Russian weapons and still keep access to America’s most advanced fighter, they warn, other governments may do the same. That would normalize deep ties with rival powers while still enjoying U.S. technology, a pattern many voters already see in trade, banking, and energy. For critics, backing down on Turkey would send the message that rules are only for the public, while insiders and foreign leaders get exceptions.
Turkey’s Push to Return and the S‑400 Problem That Will Not Go Away
Turkey’s leaders insist the expulsion was unfair, pointing to more than six decades as a North Atlantic Treaty Organization ally and their early role in the F‑35 project. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has repeatedly called for readmission and, according to reports, even explored ways to return the S‑400 to Russia or otherwise offload it. Supporters say Congress wrote a narrow test: if Turkey no longer has the S‑400 and promises not to buy similar Russian systems, the ban can be lifted. That argument appeals to those who worry the United States sometimes punishes allies more harshly than rivals, and that rigid rules can hurt long‑term cooperation.
So far, though, Turkey still possesses the S‑400, even if the system is not fully deployed. A policy study in 2025 noted Ankara has “shown no signs of good faith” that would justify softening the law. At the same time, reporting indicates Turkish industry continues to hold some F‑35 production equipment years after being cut from the official program, raising questions about how closely Washington is tracking sensitive tooling overseas. Many Americans look at these mixed signals and see a familiar pattern: complex security promises on paper, patchy enforcement in practice, and a quiet hope inside the bureaucracy that the public will not dig too deeply.
Bipartisan Warnings, Israeli Concerns, and a Deeper Trust Gap
Opposition to Turkey’s return is not just a partisan talking point. A bipartisan group of U.S. lawmakers has pressed the State Department to reject Ankara’s request to rejoin the F‑35 program, warning that any move without removing the S‑400 would expose U.S. military secrets to Russian intelligence. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has also warned that selling F‑35s to Turkey could upset the balance of power in the region, pointing to harsh rhetoric from Ankara toward Israel. These concerns feed a broader unease among citizens who feel Washington’s foreign deals often ignore real risks to peace and stability.
Trump, in Ankara: "We don't want to sanction friends." He says he will remove the CAATSA sanctions on Turkey.
CAATSA, the sanctions regime imposed in 2020 alongside Turkey's F-35 expulsion, is the actual legal mechanism blocking both the F-35 readmission and the broader defense…
— The Tectonic (@thetect0nic) July 7, 2026
Meanwhile, debates over Turkey and the F‑35 are unfolding as many North Atlantic Treaty Organization members question the jet itself and America’s leadership role. Some European officers have criticized how much control the United States keeps over the aircraft’s software and data, and several governments have delayed or reviewed their own F‑35 plans. To voters on both the right and the left, this looks like another case where high‑priced weapons, complex alliances, and global rivalries mix with half‑transparent rules. The fight over Turkey’s readmission is therefore about more than one stealth fighter. It is a test of whether the U.S. government will stick to its own security lines in the face of pressure from foreign leaders and domestic elites, or whether those lines bend whenever power is on the other side of the table.
Sources:
defensenews.com, bbc.com, turkishminute.com, aei.org, fddaction.org, youtube.com, thehill.com, pappas.house.gov, aviationweek.com, jstor.org, npr.org, en.wikipedia.org, japcc.org, f35.com
